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1A Gallop survey in 2001 found that 87% of 20-29 year olds thought they would marry. National Marriage
Project, The State of our Unions: The Social Health of Marriage in America 2001. In another survey, 80% of high
school girls reported that having a good marriage is extremely important to them. National Marriage Project, The
State of our Unions: The Social Health of Marriage in America 1999. 
2 Approximately 40% of adults live in non-marital family units, Axinn & Thornton, in Waite, The Tie That 
Binds (1996).  Between 1980 and 2002, the total number of cohabiting heterosexual couples in the United States more
than tripled, from 1,589,000 to 4,898,000. U.S. Census Bureau, Table HH-1. Households by Type:1960-Present, June
12, 2003 (available at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdem2002/hh-fam/tabHH1.csv. [During that time
the number of marriages increased from 49,112,000 to 56,747,000.]  The 2000 Census also reported almost 600,000
same sex couples. Approximately 1.35 million children were born to unmarried women in 2000, up more than 15% from
1990. According to one study, 40% of births to unmarried mothers between 1990-94 were to cohabiting couples.
Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Liu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the
United States, 54 POPULATION STUDIES . 29 (2000) An comprehensive demographic summary of changes in family form
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 Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency
Elizabeth S. Scott*
Marriage has fallen on hard times.  Although most Americans say that a lasting marriage is an
important part of their life plans,1 the institution no longer enjoys its former exclusive status as the core
family form.  This is so largely because social norms that regulate family life and women’s social roles
have changed. A century (or even a couple of generations) ago, marriage was a stable economic and
social union that for the most part lasted for the joint lives of the spouses;  it was the only option for a
socially sanctioned intimate relationship and the setting in which most children were raised.  Today,
when about 40% of marriages end in divorce, marriage is a less stable relationship than it once was.  It
is also less popular;  many couples choose to live in informal unions instead of marriage and many
children are raised by unmarried mothers, other family members, or by unmarried straight and gay
couples.2  
can be found in IRA ELLMAN, PAUL KURTZ & ELIZABETH SCOTT, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 3rd Ed._
(1997).  For a description of these trends that concludes that they are worldwide, see Judith Bruce, et. al., Families in
Focus (1995). 
3 Individuals have dependency needs at various stages of life, most notably childhood and old age. Illness
and unemployment also create dependency. Martha Fineman has identified two categories of dependency, direct
and derivative dependency. The latter is the dependency of caretakers (particularly mothers) who can not be self
sufficient economically because of their caretaking role. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30(1995);  Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL. & L. 13 (2000). 
4M. Fineman, Contract and Care,Chi.-Kent L.Rev.  Other critics of the privileged status of the nuclear
family based on marriage  include Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay ands Lesbian
Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535 (1993); Iris
Young, Reflections on Families in the Age of Murphy Brown, in N. Hirshmann & C. Di Stefano (eds. Revisioning the
Political: Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory 251 (1996); Stephanie
Coontz, The Way we Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap Judith Stacey, In the Name of the
Family (199_); Good Riddance to Families: A Response to David Popenoe, 55 J. Mar. & Family, 545 (1993)(stable
marriage depends on inequality). 
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These changes pose a challenge to foundational policies of family law.  Formal marriage is a
privileged legal status that receives substantial government protection and benefits, and is also defined
by  many legally enforceable rights and obligations between the spouses.  In a world in which marriage
no longer functions as well as it once did to provide care for children and to serve other family
dependency needs,3 it is quite appropriate to ask whether the special legal status of marriage can any
longer be justified.
This issue has been the focus of a heated debate in academic and policy circles.  On one front,
many feminists claim that marriage, the source of women’s subordination, is an outmoded institution that
increasingly is not the preferred family form.4  Martha Fineman, a leading marriage critic, argues that the
privileged legal status of marriage should be abolished in favor of a family form more deserving of legal
protection–the caretaker-dependent dyad.  Other critics contend that, in an era in which family
arrangements are understood to be a matter of private choice, cohabitation unions and marriage should
5This is part of a larger debate over the appropriate legal response to functional families generally. See infra
note _. 
6 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,[hereinafter A.L.I. Principles] Ch. 6,
Domestic Partnerships. The A.L.I. Principles only deal with inter se disputes and not with government benefits. 
7Patrick Buchanan, Right from the Beginning(1988); Caroline Graglia, The Housewife as Pariah, 18 Harv. J. L.
& Pub. Pol. 509, 511-12 (1995); Blankenhorn, marriagemovement.org.  Also among those who argue for the benefits
of marriage are sociologists such as Steven Nock, Paul Amato and Norval Glenn, whose claims are based on
substantial empirical evidence.   STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES ; A Comparison of Marriages and
Cohabiting Relationships 16 J. FAM. ISSUES  53 (1995)[hereinafter Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships]; Paul
Amato “Good Enough Marriages” Va. J. Soc. Pol. & L. (2001); Linda Waite, Does Marriage Matter? 32 Demography
483 (1995); N. Glenn, Is the Current Concern about American Marriage Warranted? Va. J. Soc. Pol. & L. (2001). 
8Some academic observers have joined in expressions of concern about family decline. D. Popenoe,
American Family Decline, 1960-1990: A Review and Appraisal, 55 J. Marriage & Family 527 (Aug. 1993).
9 Charles Murray, “The Coming White Underclass” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 29, 1993 at 14 (‘[I]llegitimacy is
the single most important social problem of our time...”); Barbara Whitehead, “Dan Quale was Right” Atlantic (1993).
At the heart of the pro-marriage movement are fundamentalist Christians who advocate a return to traditional
marriage on religious and moral grounds. Jerry Falwell, Listen America..
10Covenant marriage statutes, which allow couples entering marriage to opt out of no-fault divorce
standards, have been enacted in three states. For a discussion of the marriage movement and a study of attitudes
toward covenant marriage, see generally Hawkens, et. al, Attitudes about Covenant Marriage and Divorce: Policy
Implications of a Three State Study, 51 Family Relations 166 (2002). Many feminists have opposed covenant
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be subject to the same legal treatment.5  In this vein, the American Law Institute proposes that courts
should impose the financial rights and obligations of marriage on cohabiting parties when their
relationships end.6 
On the other side of the debate are highly visible defenders of marriage, many of whom are
social and political conservatives with a religious or moral agenda.7   These advocates make
apocalyptic claims about the negative impact of the decline of marriage on social welfare.8  Many reject
the legitimacy of alternative family forms and  aim to restore traditional marriage; they can fairly be
charged with seeking to impose a moralistic vision of the good life on the rest of society.9  In the policy
arena, a “marriage movement,” populated mostly by religious and social conservatives,  has dominated
the recent legislative initiatives to promote covenant marriage and revive fault-based divorce.10
marriage. See Barbara Ehrenreich, In Defense of Splitting Up: The Growing Anti-Divorce Movement is Blind to the
Costs of Bad Marriages Time, April 8, 1996, 80; Katha Pollitt, Can this Marriage be Saved? The Nation, Feb. 17,
1997, at 9; Is Divorce Getting a Bad Rap? Time, Sept. 25, 2000 at 82. 
11See generally text and accompanying notes 23 to 25. This issue has received a great deal of attention
recently, triggered in part by the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court that the state must afford same sex
couples the right to marry. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 3003). The
Massachusetts legislature moved pass an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting same sex marriage, but
allowing civil unions. In response to Goodridge, and to the issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples in San
Francisco, President Bush announced support for a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriages. See
Elizabeth Bumiller, Same Sex Marriage: The President; Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, New York
Times, Feb. 24, 2004, at A1. See t.a.n. _ to _ infra.
12Some advocates for the rights of gay and lesbian persons challenge this policy goal. See Polikoff, supra.
note _.
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Adding a layer of complexity to the debate is a third interest group with the distinctive agenda
of extending the privileges of marriage to same-sex couples.11  This group does not challenge the
privileged status of marriage, but rather argues that, as long as the special status continues, same-sex
couples should have the right to enjoy the tangible benefits that marriage confers as well as its symbolic
social importance.12
On first inspection, those who oppose perpetuating the favored legal status of marriage would
seem to have the better arguments.  They sensibly acknowledge that the legal regulation of family
relationships must respond to changing social values and behavior.  Moreover, the feminist contention
that marriage historically has been the source of women’s subordination is hard to refute, and the
concern that the privileged status of marriage harms other families must be taken seriously.  If legal
marriage simply rewards couples who adapt their behavior to a socially conservative norm, then the
argument that fairness, tolerance and social welfare would be promoted if marriage were “de-
privileged” has considerable force.
In this essay, I offer a modest defense of the privileged legal status of formal marriage (as I will
define this union) and legal neutrality toward informal intimate unions. My claim is that the special
13I assume that society has this collective responsibility. Libertarians and some social conservatives might
disagree with this claim.
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treatment of marriage can be justified, even if one  has no nostalgic fondness for traditional family roles
and rejects the moral superiority of marriage over other family forms.  Through marriage,  government
can delegate to the family some of society’s collective responsibility for dependency.13  Retaining its
privileged legal status in a contemporary setting can (and should) be part of a comprehensive policy of
family support that acknowledges the pluralism of modern families.  
In my framework, the government is justified in channeling intimate relationships into  marriage
because formal unions function as a useful means of providing care in a family setting.  The availability of
legal marriage allows couples to declare their commitment and choose a formal status with a package of
clearly defined and enforceable legal rights, privileges, and obligations that embody that commitment. 
Even in an era of high divorce rates, marriage represents a relatively stable family form, partly because
of its formal status and partly because it is regulated by a powerful set of social norms that reinforce
commitment.  Moreover, within a properly structured legal framework, even marriages that end in
divorce can serve quite effectively to provide a measure of financial security for  dependent family
members.  Informal unions, in contrast, are a less reliable family form because the behavioral
expectations and financial obligations between the parties are uncertain and legal enforcement is
difficult.
 Government privileging of marriage and neutrality toward informal unions does not mean that
financial understandings between parties in cohabitation relationships should be unenforceable.  To the
contrary, I argue that contract theory supports a default rule framework that presumes that property
acquired during long term cohabitation unions is shared and that support is available to dependent
14For a discussion of default rules regulating divorce generated in a hypothetical bargain framework, see
Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.1225 (1998). A similar model can be
applied to the cohabitation context.
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partners.14   Default  rules which reflect the implicit understandings of most couples in these unions will
mitigate the harsh inequity that results today when courts decide that parties’ understandings are too
ambiguous for contractual enforcement.  This autonomy-based framework is superior to the approach
of the A.L.I.  Principles, under which an unchosen status is imposed on unmarried couples.
A road map may be helpful. Part I begins with a description of the case against marriage and a
preliminary response to the critics. In Part II, I argue that marriage functions relatively well as a family
form that can satisfy dependency needs, both because of its stability and because obligations between
the parties are specified ex ante with some certainty. These advantages, which are underscored by a
comparison with informal unions, justify the legal privileging of marriage. I then turn in Part III to the
enforcement of obligations in cohabitation unions and argue for a default rule framework that presumes
marriage-like understandings about property and support in long term unions.
I. Is Marriage an Obsolete Institution?  
A. The Challenge
No one contests that families should have a protected legal status– at least not in the debate that
I am entering.  As law students recognize on the first day of class in Family Law, the special status of
families in law is readily justified because family members provide care and support to one another,
reducing the burden that society would otherwise bear in caring for children and for adults who are
unable to provide for basic needs due to illness, disability or advanced age.  
The government recognizes the useful role of families through  direct and indirect subsidies, 
15The law privileges families, particularly (but not exclusively) marriage. For example, parents get federal
income tax deductions and child care credits for children and married couples can file a single tax return, which often
offers tax advantages. Estate and gift tax law benefits family members; family status determines ranking under
intestate succession laws. Parents can get government subsidies under federal TANF laws and the Family Leave Act
allows spouses and parents to get leave from work when a family member is ill.  Family members qualify for Social
Security survivor benefits; government health insurance and pensions, etc.  Zoning ordinances favors families over
other groups.  See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1973); Horn
v. City of Ladue (Mo.S. Ct.) Haddock & Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 15 (1996). 
Family members have a special status under rent control regulations See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E. 2d 49 (N.Y.
1989). See discussion of marital benefits, infra note _. 
16Frances Olson, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public\Private Distinction, 10 Constit.
Commentary 319 (1993) MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note_
17Fineman, Shaking the Foundations, supra note _; Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption and Sex
Equality: Gender Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, Col. L. Rev. 60 (1995). 
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programs that support particular family functions, and policies that benefit families (or particular types of
families).15  Even in an earlier era when law makers insisted that families occupied a private sphere and
that government bore no responsibility for dependency, the legal regime strongly supported  traditional
marriage and harshly sanctioned other family forms.16  This stance can be  fairly criticized for excluding
from legal protection some relationships that fulfilled the social function of families,  but the fact that
marriage was privileged on this basis in itself is unsurprising. Contemporary critics of marriage do not
aim to deprive family of its privileged status;  their goal is simply  to shift or extend legal support and
privilege to other family forms. 
Thus, the contested issue is whether marriage, a particular family form that once had  monopoly
status, deserves continued deference, in an era in which other groups fulfill the function of family care. 
Two kinds of challenges are raised. First, marriage is rejected as obsolete; it is described as a union
that once was dominant but that has been (or is being) supplanted by other family forms.  Second,
critics argue  that marriage can not escape its history as a patriarchal institution that oppressed women
who married and harshly discriminated against those who did not –especially unmarried mothers.17
18Fineman Contract and Care, supra note_; Coontz, supra note _; Stacey, Brave New Families: Stories of
Domestic Upheaval in the Late 20th Century (1990).
19 Arguments for legal recognition of functional families have focused generally on relationships outside
the traditional legal categories.  These include both adult couples in informal unions and de facto parent-child
relationships. Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out? 62 Colo. L. Rev. 268 (1991); Katherine
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the
Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1984);  Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit, Beyond the
Best Interest of the Child (1973) (arguing that the law should protect the relationships between children and their
psychological parents). 
20Divorce rates reached a peak of near 50% in the early 1980s.  Since then, they have declined and stabilized
at about 40%. See Hawken, et. al., supra, note_.    
21 See research described in ROBERT EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT  (1999); Paul
Amato and Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk (1997). Most research on the impact of divorce on children indicates
that children are worse off after divorce unless divorce allows them to escape high levels of interparental conflict. 
See generally, research described in Elizabeth Scott, Divorce, Custody and the Culture Wars, 9 Va. J. Soc. Pol. & L.
95 (2001).
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The first critique holds that the utility of marriage as a viable family form has declined too much
for it to retain a privileged legal status. Even if marriage once functioned as a useful mechanism to meet
society’s dependency needs, this is not longer true, because of the dramatic social changes of the
second half of the 20th century.18  Law should adapt to these changes by protecting all relationships that
serve family functions and it should abandon the policy of  elevating the status of formal marriage.19
These social developments and their implications for the status of marriage warrant a bit more
attention.  First, feminist commentators point to divorce rates of forty per cent or more as evidence that
contemporary marriage no longer functions as a reliable setting for childrearing or for the satisfaction of
other family dependency needs.20 Divorce is associated with many psychological and economic costs to
children,21 and spouses who dissolve their marriage will not be available to care for each other in old
age. In short, marriage is so unstable, critics contend, that it is not serving the needs even of married
couples and their children.   Moreover, increasing numbers of children are reared outside of marriage,
usually by their mothers, sometimes in extended families or in families that include fathers or de facto
22See note 2, supra. Arlene Skolnick, Family Values: The Sequel, Am. Prospect, May-June 1997, at 83; Sara
MacLanahan, The Consequences of Single Motherhood, Am. Prospect, Summer 1994 at 48. For the most
comprehensive study and analysis of single parent families, see Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, SINGLE MOTHERS
AND THEIR CHILDREN; Sara MacLanahan & Gary Sandefur, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT
HELPS.
23See Minow, supra note _; Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E. 2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)(applying functional family
definition to same-sex partner of decedent tenant under New York rent control law).  Courts have also recognized
claims by de facto parents to continued relationships with children with whom they have lived in a functional family. 
See discussion in Ellman, Kurtz, & Scott, supra note _at_.
24 Beginning in the 1970s, some Canadian provinces provided for financial support when informal unions
dissolve. Ont. Fam. L. Reform Act of 1986 Sect. 29 & 30 RSO 1990, c F.3, s29 and s 30 (cohabitants of three years are
“spouses” for purposes of spousal support); Fam. Rel. Act. Of Brit. Columbia RSBC 1996 as amended 10\1\98] ch.
128 Sect. 1 (same and opposite sex cohabitants living in “marriage-like” relationship for two years are spouses under
spousal support statute).  The Canadian Supreme Court recently held that government benefits extended to married
couples could not be withheld from same sex couples under the Canadian Charter of Rights. M v. H.2 S.C.R. 3 (1999). 
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parents.22  Fineman and others point to these demographic trends as evidence that the importance of
marriage as a context for child rearing has declined.  Given that the special legal status of the family and
its claim to government support rest largely on its child rearing function, marriage, on this view, no
longer deserves the privilege that it has received traditionally. 
Other critics challenge the sharp legal distinction between marriage and cohabitation on both
utilitarian and fairness grounds.  The number of couples who live together in informal unions has
increased steadily over the past half century and mainstream society today is morally neutral toward this
form of intimate association.  In light of these developments, law makers increasingly are urged to
extend marital privileges to unmarried couples on the ground that these relationships fulfill family
functions and deserve the legal benefits and privileges that mostly have been limited to married
couples.23   
These demographic and social trends have led to several law reform initiatives in recent years. 
Canada has led the way in extending marital rights and benefits to parties in same-sex and opposite-sex
informal unions, and other Commonwealth and European countries have followed.24  In this country,
In New Zealand, financial support and property division claims are recognized when unions of three years duration
dissolve. New Zealand Marital Property Act (2001). See also discussion of domestic partnership statutes in
Denmark,(Danish Registered Partnership Act); Sweden, and France in A. L.I.  Principles, Chapter 6, comment b. 
25Nan Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 Law & Sexuality 9 (1991); WILLIAM
ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE (1996); David Chambers, The Legal Consequences of Marriage and
the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev.447 (1996); Michael Wald, Same Sex Marriage: A
Family Policy Perspective, 9 Va. Soc. Pol. & Law (2001). Three states, Vermont, California and Massachusetts, have
extended the privileges, protections and obligations of marriage to same sex couples.  Baker v. State, 744 A2d 864
(Vt. 1999); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15 §§1201-1207 (2002); Cal. Fam. Code §§ 297 (West Supp. 2004); Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). In Vermont, the legislature enacted a civil union statute, rather
than extending marriage to same sex couples. The Massachusetts court found civil unions not to be an adequate
substitute for marriage, leading the legislature to consider enacting a state constitutional amendment prohibiting
same sex marriage. At about the same time, President Bush announced support for an amendment to the federal
constitution prohibiting same sex marriage.  See note 11. 
 
26Grace Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1125 (1981);
See discussion in Ellman, Kurtz, & Scott, supra note _ at _ to _.. 
27 A. L.I. Principles, Ch. 6.
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advocates for same-sex couples have argued with some success that the exclusion of this group from
the benefits that accompany marital status violates the fundamental principle of equal treatment  under
law– and is bad policy as well.25  Other reform proponents contend that the financial obligations of
marriage should be extended to long term cohabitants to provide protection for financially vulnerable
partners.26  The American Law Institute recently proposed  the legal recognition of a domestic
partnership status that can give rise to marriage-like financial rights and obligations between partners in
cohabitation unions with no affirmative act by the parties, and, indeed, without their consent.27  These
developments suggest that the line between marriage and informal unions has become blurred and that
law makers are coming to believe that sharp legal distinctions are no longer warranted. 
 Some feminists offer a second critique, opposing marriage as a patriarchal institution that is the
source of women’s subordination and dependency.  This challenge is familiar enough that it need not be
28Many feminists welcome the decline of marriage and invoke the “obsolescence” critique in support of an
ideological argument against marriage.  See Fineman, Contract and Care, supra note _.
29 Mary Shanley, supra note _; Martha Fineman, the Neutered Mother at _; Judith Stacey, In the Name of
the Family, at _; Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were, supra note _ at );
30Judith Stacey, id. At _; Dorothy Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, Iowa L. Rev.;  Fineman, id. at _
31Stacey, Good Riddance to Families, supra note _ at _; Polikoff, supra note _.  
32Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift; Martha Fineman, Shaking the Foundations, supra note _;  Amy
Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is there a Future for Egalitarian Marriage? 84 Va. L. Rev.509 (1998).
11
repeated here.28  Feminists also point to exogenous harms of traditional marriage.  Because powerful
moral and religious norms historically dictated that marriage was the only acceptable venue for intimacy
and reproduction, unmarried mothers and their children were subject to harsh social condemnation and
excluded from the legal protections that accompanied marriage.29  These attitudes persist in the public
hostility and punitive policies toward unmarried mothers who are unable to support their families.30  
Given this history, some feminist critics find it difficult to consider seriously whether a case can
be made for retaining the special legal status of what they believe is a corrupt and illegitimate institution. 
Although it might be conceded that social and legal changes have improved things to some extent,
contemporary marriage, on the view of many feminists, continues to be contaminated by its patriarchal
history.31  Moreover, less has changed than it might seem;  wives are still burdened with responsibility
for dependency without compensation for the useful work they do, and are thereby subject to
discriminatory treatment.32  When marriages end in divorce, women and children are likely to suffer
financial hardship under current alimony and child support laws. Beyond this, women who have
invested in traditional roles often are ill-equipped to succeed in the employment sphere. In short,
marriage is a bad deal for women and its decline as a family form is welcome. 
B. A Preliminary Response
33As the census figures in note 2, supra, indicate, marriage is far from obsolete. In 2000, almost 57,000,000
couples lived in family units based on marriage, an increase of 15% since 1990. Moreover, most young persons see
marriage as part of their future. See note 1, supra. 
34See t.a.n. _ to _ infra.
35 Indeed, the robust  pluralism that characterizes contemporary families has served to dilute the stigma
traditionally attached to non-traditional families.  The reason Dan Quayle harangued Murphy Brown is that the
popular show presented unmarried motherhood in a positive light. See note _ supra.
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These critiques challenge the legitimacy and utility of contemporary recognition of marriage as a
privileged legal status and suggest that American law lags beyond that of other Western countries in
responding to social change.  As to the functional critique, there is little question that marriage no longer
represents the exclusive family form, and thus it no longer serves individual and societal dependency
needs in the way that it once did.  However, the fact that many persons today live in families not based
on marriage, or that marriage itself is a less stable union it once was, should not obscure the reality that
marriage continues to serve family care functions quite well for many people.33  Although many
marriages end in divorce, a majority do not, and, as I will demonstrate, even those that do provide
financial and relationship benefits for dependent family members that derive from the formal legal
status.34  Thus, despite the demographic trend toward diverse family forms, it is plausible to assume that
social and individual welfare is promoted by the continued availability of legal marriage as one
component of a pluralistic family support policy. Such a strategy does not stigmatize any family form; it
simply utilizes one that works quite well to provide for the care and support needs of many people.35
The ideological critique of marriage is harder to answer, at least in a way that would satisfy its
adherents.  No consensus is likely to emerge on whether the cultural and social meaning of marriage
today is indelibly tainted by its problematic history and gendered structure.  I tend to be an optimist on
this issue and to believe that contemporary marriage, although far from an egalitarian ideal, has already
36Academics and law reformers have focused on how the legal regime could better protect dependent family
members after divorce, particularly where one spouse has assumed a homemaker role.  Scott & Scott, Marriage as
Relational Contract, Jana Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic
Justification for Alimony, 82 Geo. L. J. 2423 (1994);  Ellman, A Theory of Alimony, Cal. L. Rev. (1989); Katherine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. Rev. 1 (1996).  Ellman’s approach to
alimony as compensatory payment to homemaker spouses has been adopted by A.L.I. Principles, Ch. 5,
Compensatory Spousal Payments. 
13
changed considerably in a relatively short period.  Law reform can reinforce this trend and mitigate the
costs to women of gendered marital roles.36   Of course, those who reject this view will be unmoved by
arguments about the social utility of this institution.
II. The Case for Marriage
The model of marriage that I advocate has much in common with the contemporary version –
but with some important differences.  It is a status available to individuals who want to formally
undertake a long-term commitment to another person of the same or opposite sex, to live together in an
intimate and exclusive family union – a union dissolvable only through formal legal action.  The exchange
of marriage vows represents each party’s implicit agreement to be bound by a regime of informal social
norms underscoring their commitment to the relationship and by a set of legal rights and obligations
affirming  that the union is one of economic sharing and mutual care. These obligations include the duty
to care for one another and for any children who become part of the family, to share property and
income acquired during the union, and to provide support to dependent family members should the
union dissolve.  Couples who undertake this formal commitment to one another become eligible to
receive an array of government benefits and privileges, recognizing that their relationship of mutual care
and support benefits society as well as themselves. 
I will argue that government can and should maintain and support a family form of this type, and
37See note _ describing  literature advocating legal recognition of same-sex marriage on constitutional or
policy grounds, and legislation extending marital rights to same sex unions in Vermont and California. The argument
is gaining recognition in courts also. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently held that withholding
marriage from gay couples failed to meet rational basis review. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941
(Mass. 2003). Some supporters argue that the constitutional claim has gained strength in the aftermath of Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).  However, the continued political hostility to same sex marriage is evident in the
passage of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000).  This statute provides that states need not
recognize (or give full faith and credit to) same-sex marriages formalized in other states. Some scholars argue that the
prohibition of same sex marriage is justified. See Lynn Wardle, A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Claims for
Same Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. 
38The court in Goodridge provides a comprehensive description of the government benefits and privileges
that married couples enjoy in Massachusetts. 798 N.E. 2d 941, _.
39Most opponents of same sex marriage invoke religious or moral claims about the inherently heterosexual
nature of marriage, or challenge same sex marriage as harmful to children.  See Lynn Wardle, supra note _.
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that doing so is one means by which the state can protect vulnerable members of society and respond
to the dependency needs that all individuals have over the course of a lifetime.  Marriage is also a
suitable mechanism through which the state can facilitate the pursuit of personal happiness by individual
members of society, by respecting  privacy and choice in the realm of family life.  The policy I envision
encourages couples in intimate relationships to choose marriage over informal unions, but, it is also
respectful of those who choose unions defined by a shallower commitment. 
A.  The Importance of Non-Discrimination  
 Making marriage available to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples is important for several
reasons.  First, existing marriage law discriminates against lesbian and gay couples on moral and
religious grounds that cannot be justified in contemporary society.37  Legal marriage is a status that
carries many government benefits.38  If lesbian and gay individuals seek to declare their commitment to
one another and their readiness to undertake family obligations by entering formal unions, then law
makers can legitimately withhold marital status from same sex couples  only if they can be distinguished
in some relevant way from heterosexual couples with the same goals.39  If the special legal status of
40 See note __.
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marriage is justified on the ground that the recognition of formal legal unions  promotes caretaking and
facilitates individual pursuit of happiness, these goals are satisfied through recognition of same-sex as
well as opposite-sex unions.  
The argument that states can not withhold the benefits of marriage from same sex couples has
begun to take hold, as evidenced by recent judicial and legislative developments in several states.40 
41See note _ above. 
42Some advocates for same-sex marriage have made this argument. See Nan Hunter, supra note _(“What is
most unsettling to the status quo about the legalization of lesbian and gay marriage is its potential to expose...the
historical construction of gender at the heart of marriage. [T]he impact of lesbian and gay marriage ...will dismantle
the legal structure of gender in every marriage.”).  But see Nancy Polikoff, supra note _, (arguing that gay and
lesbian advocacy of marriage is unlikely to transform gendered marriage and threatens to distort gay and lesbian
values and goals.) See also Polikoff, supra note 42.
43 The enactment to the Defense of Marriage Act by Congress followed intense advocacy by groups who
saw same sex marriage as a moral and social threat.  28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000). .
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However, same sex marriage continues to be the subject of much political controversy, similar to that
surrounding mixed-race marriage in the 1950s and 1960s. In part in response to the recent legal
reforms, amendments to state and federal constitutions prohibiting same sex marriage have been
proposed.41  Nonetheless, it seems inevitable that equality-based arguments will ultimately prevail and
that same sex marriage will eventually gain acceptance– in much the same way as mixed-race marriages
have become accepted in mainstream society. 
 A second reason to extend marriage to gay couples is that an inclusive stance would
function effectively to distance contemporary legal marriage from its historic origins, and signal that the
modern status is a union that is not grounded in hierarchical gender roles.42  This innovation would
clarify that marriage enjoys a special legal status because of its tangible and intangible social benefits
and not because of its moral superiority as a family form that preserves traditional roles.43  This legal
reform, of course, would not interfere with the ability of  religious or social groups to maintain the
traditional form of marriage. 
Today, the most compelling arguments against privileging marriage over non-marital unions are
made on behalf of same-sex couples. Courts extending rights based on family status to partners in
44See, e.g. Braschi v. Stahl Associates , supra note _, in which the New York Court of Appeals determined
that the gay life partner of a tenant in a New York rent control apartment was a “family” member for purposes of
protection under the rent control statute. The court described Braschi and the decedent as “two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence, ” that was not  “given formal recognition by the law.”  It then concluded that the statutory
meaning of “family” should not be rigidly restricted to those “who have formalized their relationship by obtaining...a
marriage license....”
45The Law Commission of Canada issued a report in 2001 advocating legal recognition and privileging of a
broad range of close personal adult relationships. Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Adult
Personal Relationships, available at http//collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/200/301/cec-cdc/beyond_conjugality-
e/pdf/37152-e.pdf.  Nancy Polikoff opposes same-sex marriage and argues that American law should follow the
example of this report and offer legal support to all relationships that serve family functions.  Nancy Polikoff, Ending
Marriage as We Know It: Reconsidering the Goal of Same Sex Marriage in Light of Canada’s Beyond Conjugality
Report, Hofstra L. Rev. (2004). 
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same-sex relationships are clearly moved by the unfairness of the discriminatory exclusion that these
couples face.44   If same sex couples are allowed to marry, the argument becomes a narrower (and
much weaker) claim on behalf of parties in informal unions who have the option to marry but choose
not to do so.
A fair question is whether a non-discrimination policy toward marriage should result in legal
recognition and privileging of relationships other than conjugal dyads. Many commentators have argued
that non-conjugal family groups should be accorded  the privileged legal status of marriage.45  In part,
the argument simply advocates parity between  functional families and marriage, a position that I
challenge in this essay. However, a more difficult question is whether a regime of formal registration
should be extended to other family groups. For example, two sisters or a group of three or more close
friends who function as a family might wish to undertake a formal legal commitment to one another that
involves the responsibilities conventionally associated with marriage. My tentative response is that these
relationships should not be accorded the privileges of marriage– at least not yet. I will argue that an
important contributor to the stability of marriage as a family form lies in reinforcement of mutual
commitment provided by the social norms surrounding this particular relationship. Currently, non-
46This statement is supported by a substantial body of quantitative research comparing marriages with
informal unions on several dimensions, including duration, parties’ health, income, relationship satisfaction,
domestic violence, etc. See research summarized in Linda Waite, Does Marriage Matter? Supra note _;  Judith
Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, supra note _; Steven Nock, Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships,
supra note _;  Linda Waite, A Comparison of Marriage and Cohabitation; MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES; Norval
Glenn, supra note _ .  An important issue in evaluating this research is whether marriage itself accounts for the
differences that are observed or other factors, such as differences in individuals who choose different types of
unions. 
47Robert Scott and I have argued that the legal default rules regulating marriage and divorce constitute
(many of) the terms of the marriage contract, and that optimal rules can be designed (and existing rules evaluated)
within a hypothetical bargain framework. Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contracts, supra note _. 
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conjugal affiliations would not benefit from this source of stability– although, this may change in the
future.  Moreover, the transaction costs involved in defining and enforcing mutual responsibilities in
unions involving more than two adults would be formidable.  Although many relationships between and
among adults may fulfill family functions, my inclination is to limit the privileged status of “marriage” to
conjugal dyads.
B. Marriage as a Commitment Contract
Legal marriage functions quite well as a family form in providing care and support to members
for at least two reasons.  First, marriages tend to be more stable relationships than are informal
affiliations, in part because the formal status is grounded in and reinforces commitment.  In the
aggregate, marriages last longer and produce greater happiness and  less conflict than cohabitation
unions.46   Because of its greater stability, marriage is likely to function more reliably as a family form
that provides care to vulnerable individuals.   Second, formal marriage is a relationship that embodies
clearly defined expectations, including financial and emotional understandings about mutual
responsibility, support and sharing.  These expectations are incorporated in the legal rights and
obligations that constitute the marriage contract and regulate its dissolution.47  Although contemporary
48Id at _.
49Eric Posner,  Family Law and Social Norms, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, (ed. F.H. Buckley
(1999); Also on the signaling function of marriage, see Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in The Fall and Rise of
Freedom of Contract, (ed. F.H. Buckley (1999); Bishop, Is He Married? Marriage as Information, 34 U. Toronto L. J.
245 (1984).  . 
50Scott, Rational Decisiomaking about Marriage and Divorce, Va. L. Rev. 1990; Posner, id. at  _
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marriage and divorce law falls short in this regard,48 marriage, properly structured, can provide
substantial financial protection to dependent spouses and other  family members.
1. Marriage as a Stable Family Form
 a. Formal Commitment and Stability of Marriage   
In part, marriage is more stable than are informal unions because of self-selection.  Individuals
who want a committed relationship of mutual care search for partners with similar goals for intimacy. 
The availability of marriage, a status with a well established social and legal meaning, allows them to
coordinate:  Each party’s choice to marry signals to the partner and to the community that he\she is
what Eric Posner calls a “good type” – a responsible person ready  to undertake a long term
commitment to an exclusive intimate affiliation.49  The marital vows also represent explicit and implicit
promises by each spouse to accept a set of responsibilities that will assure that the other’s dependency
needs are met. Through marriage, each party binds herself and each can rely on the other’s good
intentions.50  Those who are unwilling to undertake such a commitment do not choose to marry.
Beyond its function as an effective sorting and matching mechanism (separating committers from
non-committers and matching committers), the institutional dimensions of  marriage operate to reinforce
commitment.  First,  the ceremonial traditions surrounding the entry into marriage– wedding and
engagement rings, announcements, bachelor parties, and formal weddings– underscore the seriousness
of the commitment that the change in status represents.  More importantly, marriage is an institution has
51I have argued that the traditions and social norms regulating marriage serve to promote cooperation and
to reinforce the stability of the relationship. See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage,
86 Va. L. Rev. 1901 (2000).
52Gender norms define expectations about the marital (and other) behavior of husbands and wives in ways
that reinforce traditional gender roles.  For example, traditional gender norms encourage husbands to be wage
earners and wives to be primary caretakers). See Scott, Social Norms, supra note _.  
53Id. at _. 
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a clear social meaning and is regulated  by a complex set of social norms that promote cooperation
between spouses– – norms such as fidelity, loyalty, trust, reciprocity and sharing.51  These norms
express the unique importance of the marriage relationship.  They are embodied in well-understood
community expectations about appropriate marital behavior that are internalized by individuals entering
marriage. To be sure, some norms that have traditionally regulated  marriage reinforced hierarchical
gender roles -- which is one reason that feminists understandably are wary of marriage.52  However,
many marital norms (loyalty, fidelity, trust) create behavioral expectations  for both husband and wife
that underscore their mutual commitment to the relationship.    
The social norms and conventions surrounding marriage influence spousal behavior in a variety
of  ways that reinforce the stability of the relationship.53  For example, the wedding ceremony and
accompanying traditions can be understood as a public announcement of an important change in status.
The ceremony usually includes the couple’s exchange of vows and declaration of commitment before
friends and family.  Symbolically, at least, this represents an expression of each spouse’s willingness to
be held accountable, not only by the other spouse but also by the broader community, for faithful
performance of marital duties.  Marital status also signals the community that the spouses are not
available for other intimate relationships, and thus discourages outsiders interested in intimacy from
54See Bishop, supra note _. 
55Contemporary survey evidence indicates a high level of disapproval of adultery. In one poll, 77% of
respondents found extramarital sex to be “always wrong.” Nock, Marriage in Men’s Lives. Today, of course, in most
communities, sanctions for adultery are milder than in earlier times. Nonetheless, at a minimum, the spouse who
violates this norm can anticipate gossip and awkwardness in relations with friends and neighbors, not to mention (in
most cases) severe disruption of the marriage relationship. 
56Robert Axelrod has described the way in which reciprocal cooperative interactions can result in a stable
equilibrium. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 30-33 (1984)(describing patterns of cooperation in iterated
games). For an application of Axelrod’s model to marital interactions, see Scott, Social Norms, supra note _
57Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. 799 (1941)   
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approaching married persons.54  In general, the fidelity norm is quite robust;  the spouse contemplating
adultery will anticipate costs associated with guilt and community disapproval.55  Finally, the normative
framework of  marriage generally encourages cooperation between spouses and deters exit from the
relationship.56  To be sure, enforcement of marital norms has weakened considerably  in the last
generation or two, and thus their power should not be exaggerated.  Nonetheless,  the informal regime
that regulates formal marriage serves to reinforce commitment in a relationship that is almost universally
recognized to signify a uniquely important affective bond.  
The formality of marital status, together with the requirement of  legal action for both entry into
marriage and divorce, clarifies the meaning of the commitment the couple are making and underscores
its seriousness.  Legal scholars have long recognized that formal requirements serve these functions. 
Lon Fuller famously described legal formalities as serving three functions in contract law:  an evidentiary
function of clarifying the terms and meaning of the contract; a cautionary function of encouraging
deliberation by the parties in executing the agreement; and a channeling function of providing a simple
external test of an intention by the parties to undertake a particular set of legally enforceable
obligations.57  These functions are evident in the legal formalities associated with marriage.  Although
58Under the necessaries doctrine, spouses are liable to third parties who provide “necessaries” to the other
spouse– including medical care, shelter, etc. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals v. Harris , 354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987). 
59 Usually premarital agreements are executed to protect the inheritance of children of an earlier marriage
from a spousal claim or to protect one spouse’s wealth and\or income from the other. See I. Ellman, P. Kurtz, & E.
Scott, at 801.
60 Most individuals entering marriage view it as a lifelong commitment. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17
Law & Hum. Behav. 439 (1993).
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wedding ceremonies vary a great deal depending on the couple’s religious traditions, wealth and
preferences, all couples must “register” their marriage with civil authorities as a legal change in status.
The formality of the occasion encourages deliberation and solemnity– an acknowledgment that the
decision represents an important commitment and the undertaking of legal obligations between the
spouses. Finally, the nature and extent of these obligations are defined by the formal legal status.
The package of substantive legal obligations that goes with the formal status of marriage serves
independently to promote stability in the relationship.  The mutual duty of financial support and physical
care,58 the presumption that marital property and income will be shared, and the duty to share a portion
of each spouse’s estate automatically attach upon marriage.  These obligations sharply distinguish this
relationship from other affective bonds;  and the willingness to conform to the law’s expectations is a
good measure of each party’s intentions for an enduring union.  Although spouses are freer than they
were a generation ago to contract out of marital obligations, few in fact do so.59 The goals and personal
expectations of most individuals entering marriage align with the legal obligations that they undertake in
deciding on this formal status.60
The stability of marriage should not be exaggerated, of course, in an era in which a large
percentage of marriages end in divorce. Nonetheless, the factors that I describe serve to stabilize 
marriages as relatively durable and harmonious affiliations–  at least in comparison with informal
61See discussion in Section b, infra. 
62Judith Seltzer, supra note _ at 1249; Steven Nock, Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships; LINDA WAITE
& MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE; ; Bumpass & Liu, supra note _ (only 10%of couples continue to
live together in informal unions for 5 years);  Willis & Michael, supra note 2. Moreover, those who cohabit and then
marry have less stable marriages than couples who do not cohabit, probably because of selection effects.  Nock,
Marriage and Cohabiting Relationships, supra note _ at _.o at _.
63Nock, Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, supra note _ at _
64Id at _. They are also less satisfied with the sexual relationship with their partner. See Waite and
Gallagher, supra note _ at 82-83. 
65Linda Waite, Trends in Men’s and Women’s Well-Being in Marriage, in L. Waite, (ed.), The Tie That
Binds, 368 at 379-83. Waite found that engaged cohabiting couples had domestic violence rates comparable to
married couples (a probability of 3.6% over the coming year). The probability for cohabiting couples with no plans to
marry was 7.6%. Id. at 381-82. 
66Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, supra note _; Waite id. 
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unions.61  In entering marriage, most couples expect to be together for a long time in a relationship in
which they provide mutual care and support to one another (and to children who join the family).  The
normative and legal framework, by structuring marriage as a solemn  affirmative decision to undertake
serious mutual obligations and to conform to a prescribed set of behavioral expectations, enhances their
prospects of achieving their goal. 
b. Comparing Cohabitation to Marriage  
A significant body of research demonstrates that, in general, marriages are more stable than are
cohabitation relationships.  Marriages tend to last considerably longer than do informal unions; most
cohabiting couples either marry or break off the relationship within a few years.62   Cohabiting
individuals also express lower levels of commitment to their relationships than do spouses, and they are
less likely to be in accord with one another on this dimension.63 Research also indicates that cohabiting
partners are more likely than married persons to engage in acts of sexual infidelity64 and domestic
violence,65 and that spouses generally express greater happiness with their relationships.66   Finally,
67See Seltzer, supra note _, explaining that a  high % of cohabiting couples marry within a year or two.  
68For example, marriage might result in loss of Social security benefits, pension rights, or spousal support
from an earlier marriage. Some individuals and couples reject marriage for ideological reasons, and some are wary due
to earlier marital failures. See Carol Smart, Stories of Family Life: Cohabitation, Marriage, and Social Change, 17 Can J.
Fam. L. 20 (2000).
69Nock, Marriage and Cohabiting Relationships, supra note _. 
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spouses are more likely to share assets and income and to co-mingle their finances. 
The earlier discussion suggests why, in the aggregate, cohabitation unions are less stable than
marriage.  As with marriage, self-selection plays a role. To state the obvious, cohabitation may appeal
to some couples because it is not marriage.  Cohabitation relationships may be casual affiliations
entered into for limited purposes without serious consideration of commitment--  or they may be trial
unions that allow the couple to determine whether they want to commit to one another.67   Some
cohabiting couples, to be sure, may share a long term commitment, but decline to marry for principled
or practical reasons.68  Alternatively, a cohabitation union that begins casually or tentatively  may evolve
over time into a stable union that is like marriage in many regards.  For the most part, however, 
informal unions can be distinguished from marriage by the parties’ intentions and goals for the
relationship. 
Another difference between cohabitation and marriage (and source of instability for
cohabitation) is that informal unions are “underinstitutionalized.”69  In contrast to marriage, no well
defined social norms encourage cohabiting  parties to act toward one another in ways that reinforce the
relationship. In part, this is because the expectations and understandings of the parties in these unions
vary.  While couples entering marriage are provided with an established template of behavioral patterns
that most will follow, no such template guides cohabiting couples, even those who are inclined toward
commitment. Moreover, the cohabiting couple’s family, friends and community may lack clear
70Id. At _.   See also Julie Brines & Kara Joyner, The Ties That Bind: Principles of Cohesion in Cohabitation
and Marriage, 60 Am. Soc. Rev. 333 (1999). These authors describe costs and benefits of the absence of a system of
social norms regulating informal unions.  Cohabiting couples are freer to experiment and develop relationships that
are tailored to their individual needs. However, the partners may have less incentive to jointly invest in the
relationship and they lack guidelines for “how partners might conduct themselves once they set up a household.” 
Id at 350-51.
71Robert Emery, supra note _. See Studies described in Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child
Custody, Cal. L. Rev. 
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expectations about cohabiting behavior. Thus, the norms that regulate informal unions are tentative and
uncertain at best, in contrast to the informal regime of expectations and enforcement that reinforces
cooperative behavior in marriage.70
If marriage is a more stable family form than are informal unions, then in this regard, at least, it is
superior as a setting for satisfying family dependency needs. Couples in stable intimate partnerships are
better able to generate financial and emotional resources that are necessary for the care of children and
other dependent family members over an extended period of time.  They also are more likely to be
available to provide care to one another in old age and in times of illness.  The value of family stability is
important in other ways. It is well established that secure relationships with parents contribute in critical
ways to healthy child development and that family dissolution imposes financial and psychological costs
on children.   Other than in situations of domestic violence, intense inter-parental conflict, or other
maltreatment, children’s  development usually is enhanced if their parents’ relationship endures.71  In
general, adequate fulfillment of family dependency needs requires ongoing  involvement and investment
over time–  which is more likely to happen in marriage than in informal unions.
2. Marital Obligations and the Satisfaction of Dependency Needs
a. Financial Obligations in Marriage and Divorce
Marriage is a useful family form not only because it tends to be more stable than other unions,
72McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (holding that legal obligation of spousal support is not
enforceable in intact marriage). There are good reasons not to enforce financial obligations in intact marriages. See
Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract at _.
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but also because the formal undertaking of legal rights and obligations that accompanies marriage can
function to provide financial security to families members.  When they exchange marital vows,
individuals agree that they will take upon themselves a substantial measure of  responsibility for each
other’s needs, and the needs of children who may join their family (and possibly other family members
as well). The agreement to assume these obligations and the satisfactory performance of marital duties
relieve society of that much of the burden of dependency.  Thus, it is fair to say that responsibility for
dependency in marriage is not simply relegated to the private realm of the family by the government, as
some feminists have argued.  Rather, through marriage, the individual spouses represent to society as
well as to each other a willingness to assume a substantial portion of the burden of family care and
support.  
Contemporary legal regulation of marriage and divorce creates a set of rights and duties
between spouses that offer greater financial security to family members in marriage than other families
enjoy.  To be sure, the marital duty to provide financial support to dependant spouses and children is
seldom legally enforced in intact families.  Nonetheless, the obligation is well understood and, for the
most part, legal enforcement is unnecessary.72  Family members living together usually tend to identify
individual and collective interests– and it is hard not to share a standard of living.  A combination of
strong social norms and affective bonds usually is sufficient to encourage spouses and parents to
provide adequate care and support to dependent family members.  The refusal to provide adequately
for family members’ needs despite the ability to do so is likely to be met with disapproval from friends,
73Scott, Social Norms, supra. note _ ; Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract. An extreme example of
this behavior is the recent New Jersey case in which adoptive parents were accused of starving four of their seven
children, and seemingly took good care of the others. Iver Peterson, In Home That Looked Loving, 4 Boys Suffering
was Unseen, NY Times, 10\28\03 at A1. Public outrage at the alleged conduct was intense, although the story, as it
unfolded, suggested complexities not known at the outset (including the possibility that the children suffered from
medical\ psychological conditions that contributed to their condition. Leslie Kaufman, and Richard Lezin Jones,
Amid Images of Love and Starvation, A More Nuanced Picture Emerges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2003, at 31. 
Nonetheless, the parents face criminal charges for their conduct. 
74Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, supra note _ at _.    Marriage also has more subtle
protective effects that protect family members after dissolution.  Divorced non-custodial parents comply with child
support payment orders at a much higher rate than their unmarried counterparts, and are more likely to maintain
relationship with their children. . 
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neighbors, and community members.73 
The formal legal status becomes even more important as a source of protection to dependent
family members if the marriage ends in divorce.  The default rules that regulate support and property
distribution on divorce can best be understood as the dissolution terms of the marriage contract.74  The
exchange of marital vows represents agreement to be bound by the legal obligations embodied in these
rules (and offers the assurance that the other spouse is also bound).   Property and support rules can
prescribe with relative certainty the claims held by dependent spouses to property and (together with
minor children) to financial support when marriage ends.  The quality of financial protection received by
vulnerable spouses and children on divorce depends on the extent and certainty of obligations under
divorce doctrine, of course, and contemporary law is far from optimal in this regard. Criticism of
current law, however, should not lose sight of the fact that the legal framework regulating divorce can
(and to an extent, does) serve as an effective mechanism to define financial obligations on the basis of
marital roles when marriage ends. 
b. Meeting Family Dependency Needs in Cohabitation Unions
1. Expectations and Enforcement  Informal unions function far less effectively to assure that
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the dependency needs of vulnerable family members will be met. In comparison with marriage,
cohabitation relationships are not regulated by clearly defined norms that prescribe behavioral
expectations of financial support and sharing.  More importantly, these unions lack a legal framework
that prescribes and enforces financial obligations.  Together with (and related to) variations in level of
commitment, couples living together have varying expectations about financial interdependency.  Many
couples likely assume that property and income acquired while the couple live together are not shared--
this preference may be a reason not to marry.  Some may engage in income pooling but expect that
property is separate, while others may assumes that income and property are shared but that the
support obligation ends when the relationship dissolves.  Still other unmarried couples may view their
mutual obligations to be indistinguishable from marriage.  The expectations about the duty to provide
financial support of a partner’s child from an earlier union also likely vary considerably among
cohabiting couples.  Finally, the parties may not even have the same understanding or expectations
about financial sharing, particularly upon dissolution.  One may believe the union is marriage-like, while
the other may prefer cohabitation over marriage as a means of enjoying the benefits of marriage while
limiting financial obligations.  
The freedom that we have today to live in informal unions expands our opportunities for
arranging our intimate lives according to our preferences.  From the perspective of society, however,
cohabitation is less satisfactory than marriage as a family form.  This is due to a reduced level of
commitment and stability generally in informal unions, and also to the uncertainty that is generated by the
lack of uniformity in the expectations and understandings about financial responsibility.  Moreover, even
in marriage-like unions, dependent partners confront a harsh reality when the relationship ends. Because
cohabitation unions carry no prescribed legal obligations and because cohabiting couples usually do not
75See e.g. Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1994); Morone v. Morone, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1992);
Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1982). Some courts and legislatures have found that a written agreement
between cohabiting parties is necessary for enforcement of financial obligations.  Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d. 759
(Fla. App. 1997); Minn. Stat. Sects 513.075; 513.076; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Sect 26.01 (b)(3).  Since few cohabiting
couples execute written agreements, a writing requirement means that few claims will be recognized. Robbennolt &
Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Therapeutic and
Preventative Approach, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 417 (1999).  
76Many domestic partnership laws are municipal ordinances designed to provide limited government
benefits (health and life insurance for partners of government employees) for same-sex couples; In 2003, California
enacted a comprehensive domestic partnership statute which extends to same-sex couples who register as domestic
partners, the legal “rights, protections, benefits and responsibilities” that are granted to spouses. See note _ supra. 
Several European countries have adopted comprehensive “registered partnership” laws, which extend marital rights
to same sex couples. See Ellman, Kurtz, & Scott,  at 982-86. 
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formalize their understandings contractually, ex post determination of the nature of the parties’
expectations about financial sharing and support is difficult.  As a result, legal enforcement of financial
obligations is an uncertain business.   Even in long-term cohabitation unions in which the relationship
appears to be marriage-like, courts often fail to find sufficiently clear mutual understanding between the
parties to support contractual enforcement.75  Thus, in comparison to marriage with its set of relatively
clear obligations, informal unions provide little financial security for vulnerable family members.  
  2. A.L.I. Domestic Partnership Status   The A.L.I. Domestic Partnership Principles are
designed to remedy this problem.  A domestic partnership under the A.L.I. Principles differs
considerably from the standard version of this status, which typically is available through registration and
carries relatively limited government benefits.76   The Principles, in contrast, offer a standard by which
courts can evaluate financial disputes between  intimate partners when informal unions dissolve: If the
court determines ex post that the relationship was a domestic partnership, it is subject to the rules for
property division and compensatory support payments that apply to marriage. [The Principles do not
affect government benefits or create a   privileged legal status.]  Under the A.L.I. scheme, same- or
opposite-sex couples who live together for a prescribed cohabitation period (2 or 3 years is suggested)
77Principles, Ch. 6 Sect. 6.03. Couples who have a child are presumed to be domestic partners if they live
together.
78Chapter 7 of the Principles regulates agreements between parties that opt out of the obligations
established under the Principles.  
79The Commentary in Chapter 7 of the Principles emphasizes that contracts dealing with the consequences
of family dissolution can not be enforced under standard contract doctrine that applies to commercial contracts
because married individuals are subject to cognitive limitations in their capacity to anticipate dissolution and also
because of the differences between intimate and commercial relationships. See Commentary Sect. 7.02. Section 7.05
provides that agreement terms should not be enforced that would “work a substantial injustice.”  This may be found
after a fixed number of years (as set by a rule of statewide application)   where there is a substantial disparity
between the outcome under the agreement and the outcome under prevailing legal principles.
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are presumed to be domestic partners.  If the status is contested, however, the determination of
whether the union qualifies can involve a broad ranging inquiry into the nature of the relationship;  for
example, factors under the standard include whether the couple intermingled finances, maintained a
“qualitatively distinct relationship,” shared emotional and physical intimacy, assumed specialized roles,
and acknowledged their commitment to one another.77  
 One aspect of the A.L.I. domestic partnership status deserve further attention. As I have
mentioned, the status is imposed automatically at the end of the cohabitation period without the parties’
consent.  Couples who don’t want to be subject to the property distribution and support obligations of
marriage can opt out through express agreement–  at least in theory.78  However, the Principles limit 
couples’ ability to contract out of domestic partnership obligations by giving courts broad discretion to
refuse to enforce these contracts when there is a substantial disparity between the financial distribution
under the agreement and the outcome prescribed by the Principles.79   Thus, at least implicitly, the
Principles  take the normative position that cohabiting couples should not be free to choose lasting
unions of limited interdependency and commitment.
Putting aside its illiberal character for now, the A.L.I. domestic partnership status promises to 
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provides greater financial protection to dependent parties in informal  unions than is currently available. 
It will mitigate real hardship and unfairness by enforcing expectations in long-term marriage-like unions
and by discouraging exploitation by parties with greater financial sophistication and resources. 
However, the mechanism by which these beneficial ends are accomplished is costly, intrusive, and
fraught with uncertainty.  In contrast to couples who choose formal marriage, parties in informal unions
will not know until after the relationship ends whether it qualifies as a domestic partnership. This
uncertainty makes domestic partnerships rather unreliable as a means of fulfilling family dependency
needs. 
The substantial cost and limited utility of the A.L.I. domestic partnership derives from its
structure as an ex post designation of family status. First, from the perspective of judicial economy, the
new status promises to generate a flood of litigation by hopeful claimants. Given the indeterminacy of
the standard,  the pay-off for successful claimants, and the relatively modest duration of the proposed
cohabitation period, it seems likely that many marginal claims will arise when informal unions dissolve. 
Moreover, under the complex and indeterminate standard for demonstrating domestic partnership
status, expensive and intrusive inquiries often will be necessary to discern whether the relationship
qualifies as a domestic partnership. (What evidence will be offered of the parties’ emotional and
physical intimacy?)  As is always true with ex post inquiries, the parties are likely to offer conflicting
accounts of their relationship and courts must try to sort out the truth. 
This is not to say that courts should reject property and support claims by dependent partners
in long term cohabitation unions. Valid  claims should be recognized: Enforcing the expectations of the
parties in marriage-like unions and preventing exploitation are important goals that support legal
enforcement, despite the messiness of the process.  I will shortly turn to an alternative framework that is
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based on contract default rules, an approach that is more solidly grounded in conventional doctrine and
in familiar liberal principles than is the A.L.I. approach.  However, it is important to be clear that ex
post determinations of family obligations in informal unions offer only limited protection to dependent
family members– whether under the A.L.I. Domestic Partnership Principles or through a regime of
contract default rules.   This is because the  nature of the parties’ commitment to one another and the
contours of their legal obligations are ascertained only when the relationship ends. The partner who
chooses to undertake a specialized family role that leaves her financially vulnerable can hope that she
will be provided with support and a share of property should the relationship end, but that will happen
only if a court concludes that the criteria for domestic partnership or contractual obligation have been
met.
 The advantages of marriage as a formal commitment undertaken ex ante by the parties become
more apparent when compared to cohabitation or to domestic partnership status as envisioned by the
A.L.I.  Parties in informal unions can establish financial claims, but it is a cumbersome and uncertain
business.  The A.L.I. approach invites litigation about the status itself and only when that is settled can
dependant family members have any measure of security.  Substantial benefits  follow if couples in
functional family unions formalize their relationships; at that point, the terms of their commitment and the
extent of mutual financial obligations are clear  and need not be determined through ex post inquiry. 
Thus, society quite sensibly might prefer that couples in long-term intimate unions choose marriage over
cohabitation.
D. A Functional Justification for Marital  Privilege
The upshot of my analysis is that law makers should (continue to) treat formal marriage as 
“special,” not because it is morally superior to other family affiliations, but as a means of encouraging
80“Marital privilege”  (ie what distinguishes marriage as a special legal status) is conventionally interpreted
to include government benefits, privileges, rights and duties, and also the rights and obligations between the parties.
81 The default designation of spouses as presumed guardians for one another and as surrogate
decisionmakers under medical consent statutes assign roles that are presumed to reflect the preferences of most
spouses.  Inheritance rights similarly embody presumed preferences, with the important qualification that spouses
can not be disinherited. 
33
couples in or contemplating committed unions to formalize their relationships and of rewarding them for
doing so.  Couples who are ready to undertake commitment will be more likely to marry if marriage
offers some advantages over cohabitation.  Marital privilege also serves as compensation for the
willingness of couples to undertake the obligations of marriage and to abide by its sharing and
responsibility norms.80  Thus, under a well structured marital regime, government benefits and
protections serve as a quid pro quo for the couple’s agreement to alleviate society’s dependency
burden. 
A package of modest but tangible government benefits and privileges serves these purposes. 
Special treatment of married couples in the domains of income and estate tax, military and government
pensions, family leave, health and life insurance, and social security benefits are familiar under the
current regime.  Other dimensions of marital privilege such as inheritance rights and guardianship
designation give each spouse a special status in relation to the
other, acknowledging the presumed preferences of married persons.81  
Calibrating the level of marital privilege –how special the legal status of marriage should be–is a
tricky business, and it is unclear whether the current package of benefits is optimal.   The level of
privilege should be sufficient to encourage couples to formalize their unions, but not so excessive that
the social cost of maintaining a  special status exceeds the benefits.  In general, as compared to other
family forms, marriage would seem to be a relatively cost- effective means to satisfy dependency needs. 
82Of course, if the package of marriage benefits is too generous, some individuals or couples who lack
commitment may be tempted to marry. Sham marriages offer little social benefit and excessive privilege undermines
the signaling function of marriage between the parties.  Spouses who marry opportunistically can not be counted on
to fulfill their obligations of support and sharing, but fraud might be costly to detect– at least in intact marriages.
Monitoring costs are high in intimate family relationships. Scott & Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, supra note _. 
Moreover, dissolution can be costly and disruptive and post-divorce enforcement of obligations could be costly
with this
83See t.a.n, supra note_.
84Non-legal symbols include engagement and wedding rings, announcements, name change, and fancy
weddings.  See Scott, Social Norms at 1917-18.  Some of these are less prevalent than in earlier periods–name change
and banns, for example. 
85 Advocates for access to marriage for same-sex couples have emphasized  its symbolic importance. See
William Eskridge, The Case for Gay Marriage, supra note _.
86Benefits that are available to families that include children, regardless of whether parents are married
include government employee health care benefits, family leave, and Social Security disability and survivior benefits.
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Fulfillment of the marital support obligation by wage-earning spouses provides resources that are not
reliably available to other families, who may require more in the way of direct government subsidies.  In
short, modest levels of government benefits would likely be money well spent if the desired effect of
encouraging marriage is produced.82   
Legal privileging of marriage might also be challenged if it has the undesirable effect of
contributing to social stratification by elevating marriage over other family types.83  The privileged status
of marriage has symbolic as well as functional importance, signaling society’s approval of this family
form.  Although many conventions that define marriage as a status of
 social distinction are not legal in nature,84 the legal privileging of marriage has contributed  historically to
the stigmatizing of other families.  To some extent,  this problem is mitigated if marriage is available to all
couples, without discriminatory exclusions.85  Moreover, families composed of unmarried parents and
their children are also entitled to many of the legal benefits of marriage, and may be eligible for other
government benefits needed to provide adequate support.86  Nonetheless, this concern reinforces the
Single-parent families may also be eligible for direct financial subsidies that are not available to married couples,
under programs such as TANF, etc. This is not to suggest that the package of benefits available to other families
currently is adequate to satisfy family dependency needs.    
87  The trend has been toward more routine enforcement of premarital agreements, although recently there
has been some retrenchment.  The traditional approach was to monitor these agreements for both procedural and
substantive fairness, and to set aside agreements that were unfair either at the time of execution or at the time of
enforcement (typically when the parties divorce.  The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, adopted by 24 states,
focuses on procedural fairness, applying an unconscionability standard to substantive review. Moreover, the UPAA
directs courts to set aside agreements on the basis of fairness at the time of enforcement, only if enforcement of a
support restriction  will leave one spouse on public assistance.  Many courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the
U.P.A.A have set aside agreements on the basis of unfairness at the time of enforcement, however, where the
agreement results in a  lopsided distribution. See discussion in ELLMAN, KURTZ & SCOTT, FAMILY LAW, supra note _
at 822-32. The recent A.L.I. Principles give courts considerable discretion to set aside premarital agreements on
fairness grounds.  See note _ supra.
88This is well demonstrated by cases in which courts either refuse to recognize contractual understandings
or fail to find a contract in a long-term marriage-like union.  In Hewitt v. Hewitt, for example, the Illinois Supreme
Court pointed to the abolition of common law marriage as evidence of a legislative policy against recognizing
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admonition against excessive privilege.  The social utility of marriage justifies a modest incentive- and
compensation-based privilege; it does not justify stigmatizing distinctions.
One implication of this rationale for privileging marriage is that opting out of marital obligations
through premarital agreements becomes more problematic than it is understood to be under current
law.87  If marriage (in part) is a contractual exchange between society and the couple, the availability of
this privileged status should be contingent on the couple’s  readiness to assume the obligations of
financial sharing and support. Other intimate relationships between adults properly belong in the domain
of contract.
III.   Enforcement of Obligations in Non-Marital Unions
The legitimate preference that lawmakers have for formal marriage with its set of clear
obligations does not mean that inter se financial claims by parties in long-term informal unions should be
rejected.  Any other response would often result in harsh inequity;88 sanctions for failure to choose
contractual claims in informal unions. The Hewitts had lived together for many years with their children and held
themselves out as being married. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).  See also Morone v. Morone, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1980)(declining to recognize implied contracts; case involved property or support claim by woman in 25 year union
in which couple held selves out as husband and wife); Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr 892 (1994) (no sufficiently
clear conduct to indicate implied contract for support in 25 year marriage-like union in which couple lived together
with two children).   
89  In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court pointed to changing social values as the basis of its
decision that contracts between cohabiting parties should be enforced, and that the public policy justification for the
traditional stance against enforcement was no longer valid. 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). 
90A New Jersey court found an express contract for support in the man’s statement during the relationship
that he would support the woman for the rest of her life if she would return to live with him. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski,
403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979).  Other courts have recognized express oral contracts to share property. Cook v. Cook, 691
P2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A2d 553 (Pa. Super. 1984). See also Recigno v. Recigno, A-2023-01T5 slip
op. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1\07\03)(recognizing joint venture and dividing assets between couple who held
themselves out as husband and wife in a 26 year personal and business relationship). 
91Although some courts have insisted that only express contracts between cohabitants will be enforced,
others have been more open to implied contracts. Compare Morone v. Morone, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980); Merrill v.
Davis, 673 P2d 1285 (N.M. 1983); Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A2d 1218 (N.H. 1982)(only express contracts enforced) with
Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); Hay v. Hay, 678 P2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303
(Wis. 1987); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W.Va. 1990); Boland v. Catalano (Colo. 521 A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987)
(express and implied-in-fact contracts enforced).
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marriage are not justified in a social environment that is morally neutral toward cohabitation.89  Instead,
courts should enforce, under ordinary contract principles, agreements between cohabiting parties
dealing with property distribution and support. 
Many courts have adopted this view in recent years and have been ready to enforce these
contracts.  If a couple has an express written agreement, enforcement is usually straightforward.
Sometimes, even without a writing, substantial evidence exists of the couple’s agreement that property
acquired during the union would be shared or that one party would provide post-dissolution support.90 
Often, however, no express agreement can be proved and the claimant must seek to demonstrate that
the parties had a contract implied in fact based on conduct. 
Courts’ responses to financial claims by cohabitating parties based on conduct rather than
express promise have been mixed.91  In general, contracts implied in fact will be legally enforced if the
92One court found an agreement by the couple who cohabited for 23 years to hold property as if they were
married, by looking at the “purpose, duration and stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties.”
Hay v. Hay, 678 P2d 672,674 (Nev. 1984). An Oregon appellate court suggested that the determination of whether the
parties had an implicit agreement to share assets equally should be based inter alia on “how the parties held
themselves out to the community, the nature of the cohabitation, [and] joint acts of a financial nature, if any...and the
respective financial and non-financial contributions of each party.” Wallender v. Wallender, 870 P2d 232,234 (Or.
App.1994). Under the facts, the court found that the parties, who cohabited for nine years after their marriage
dissolved, intended to share a tract of land purchased in the defendant’s name, but improved and maintained by the
plaintiff. However, the court found that the plaintiff did not intend to share other property. See also Shuraleff v.
Donnelly, 817 P2d 764 (Or. App.1991)(intent to share assets found in couple’s discussions of saving and investing
for retirement); Glasco v. Glasco, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. App. 1980) (intent found in situation and relation of parties);
Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908 (Cal. App. 1997); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E. 2d 430, 438 (W.Va. 1990); Watts v.
Watts, 405 N.W. 2d 303,313 (Wisc. 1987). Courts also point to a course of conduct between the parties as evidence
of an oral agreement. See Cook v. Cook, 691 P2d 664, 667 (Ariz. 1984) Ann Estin points out that the line between
express oral agreements and agreements implied from conduct is murky, but can be quite important in jurisdictions
that recognize the former but not the latter. Ann Laquer Estin, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v.
Marvin: Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1381 (2001). For example, see Morone v. Morone, supra note
_
93In Friedman v. Friedman, supra, for example, the parties agreed to share property accumulated during a 
relationship of more than 20 years, but the court declined to order support for Ms. Friedman, who was seriously
disabled. 
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conduct is promissory, that is, if it is sufficiently clear to demonstrate an understanding between the
parties that an obligation exists. Courts have sometimes found sufficient evidence of promissory conduct
to enforce implied agreements to share property acquired during the relationship– focusing on the
duration and nature of the cohabiting relationship, the extent of financial intermingling, contributions by
the claimant to income and property acquisition, and evidence of marriage-like sharing generally.92 
Parties claiming post-dissolution support have been less successful, as court have declined to infer
promissory conduct from the parties’ adoption of marital roles.93 
In general, although claimants have sometimes prevailed, enforcement of implied contracts by
cohabitants is uncertain and costly. As I have suggested, the extent and nature of understandings about
financial sharing and support varies in informal unions, and the ability of  third parties (ie courts) to
discern accurately the parties’ expectations on the basis of their conduct in this context is limited. Even
where cohabitants have held themselves out as a married couple for many years, courts sometimes
94Farnsworth, Contracts, Sect. 3.27 (discussing indefiniteness of contract terms as basis for non-
enforcement). See Friedman, supra, at 898-99, finding insufficient evidence of clear intent to provide support. 
95A few courts describe such a “presumption” which often operates to defeat claims to share property ans
to post-dissolution support.  Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d. 1154 (N.Y. 1980)(declining to find an
implied contract for support where couple lived together for 20 years and held themselves out as husband and wife).
See also Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. App. 1998 )(“services rendered during a meritricious
relationship are presumably gratuitous.”); Tapley v. Taply, 449 A2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1982). 
96Although many claims are unsuccessful, courts have employed a variety of theories to enforce financial
obligations arising from parties’ conduct in informal unions, including not only implied contract, but also
constructive and resulting trust, quantum meruit and implied partnership. For an excellent analysis of the responses
of courts to financial claims by cohabiting parties and description of the different theories employed, see Ann Estin,
supra note _.  
97The comments to the ALI Domestic Partnership Principles, justify the adoption of a domestic partnership
status on the ground that most couples have no contractual understanding.  A.L.I. Principles, Ch. 6
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conclude that the parties’ understandings are not sufficiently definite for contractual enforcement.94  In
some jurisdictions, the problem is exacerbated by the application of an implicit default rule that parties
in intimate unions render personal services gratuitously without expecting compensation.95 Moreover,
the process of adjudicating these claims is costly and cumbersome, as parties present evidence of
behavior over many years that was (or was not) implicit with promise.  The  unpredictability of
outcomes discourages settlements.  The upshot is that courts have struggled to achieve fair outcomes in
response to these claims, but the results have been unsatisfactory from the perspective of protecting
financially  vulnerable parties.96
    Some commentators have responded to these difficulties by concluding that the contractual
framework is unsuitable for this context because the parties’ understandings are too ambiguous. The
approach of the A.L.I. Domestic Partnership Principles is representative of this response.97  Ira Ellman,
Chief Reporter for the A.L.I. Principles, and a long-time skeptic about the use of contract as a
mechanism for regulating financial obligations in intimate relationships generally, challenges the feasibility
98Ira Ellman, Contract Thinking was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, Notre Dame L. Rev (2002). See also Ira Ellman, A
Theory of Alimony, Cal L. Rev. (1989)
99 Some courts have implicitly adopted this approach. In Recigno v. Recigno, supra note _, the court, in
recognizing joint venture and dividing the assets between a couple who lived together for 26 years, emphasized the
extent to which the parties had conducted themselves as husband and wife in every aspect of their lives. The court
stated that “the nature of the relationship was truly a joint venture of a personal and business nature ...it was the
mutual intent of the parties to be partners.” A-2023-01T5 slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1\07\03).
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of using a contract framework in this setting.98  Ellman argues that unmarried couples do not think in
contractual terms, and seldom have understandings about financial obligations upon dissolution that are
sufficiently clear to be subject to legal enforcement as contract terms.  Ellman’s (and the A.L.I.’s)
response is to substitute a non-consensual status as the mechanism to enforce financial obligations
between intimate partners.   
For reasons that I will address shortly, the A.L.I.s abandonment of  contract is undesirable.  It
is also unnecessary, in that  contract law can provide efficient default rules to clarify the implied
understandings about property and support obligations between  parties in long-term intimate unions. 
The application of  properly structured default rules can facilitate legal enforcement and simplify the
judicial evaluation of these claims.
The simple premise of the default framework that I propose is that where a couple provide
clear evidence through their conduct that their relationship is marriage-like, their agreement to assume
marital obligations can be inferred– and legally enforced. 99  Where a couple lives together for many
years, sharing a life and financial resources, and holding themselves out as husband and wife, it is a
sound presumption that they intend to share the property acquired during the relationship.   Further, a
couple who assume traditional marital roles of wage earner and homemaker can be presumed to intend
to provide the financially dependent partner  with “insurance” in the form of support, should the
100 See Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, supra note _, in which we argue that parties in a
hypothetical bargain before marriage would agree to provide post-dissolution support as insurance against the risks
of assuming a marital role that results in financial vulnerability.  
101Clearly, parties can enter a cohabitation union with marriage-like commitment, but duration is the only
practical practical means by which 3rd parties can identify marriage-like unions ex post. 
102 Only about 10% of cohabiting couples live in informal unions for 5 years or longer.  Bumpass & Liu,
supra note _  at 33. If the cohabiting couple have children together, it makes sense for the birth of the child to
triggers the presumption.  This is the A.L.I. approach. 
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relationship dissolve.100  The default terms of the marriage contract represent mutual obligations that
spouses incur whether or not they expressly agree; these obligations should also be incurred in
marriage-like informal unions.
The challenge is to design clear criteria that separate marriage-like unions from those in which
the parties are not married because they do not want marital commitment or obligations. The
framework should be as simple as possible, in order to clarify obligations and promote certainty for
both courts and parties.  In my view, a cohabitation period of substantial duration is the best available
proxy for commitment, and the only practical means to avoid intrusive and error-prone inquiry in the
effort to distinguish marriage-like relationships from more typical informal unions that involve less
financial interdependency.101  A period of five years or more, for example, supports a presumption that
the relationship was marriage-like and discourages opportunistic and marginal claims.  At that point, the
party challenging the contractual obligation can fairly be required to demonstrate that the parties’ intent
was not to undertake marital obligations and that the union was of a different kind.  A five year period
will significantly limit the category of claimants, because most informal unions do not last this long.102  
Thus, a presumption based on this duration promises to be a relatively accurate sorting mechanism for
separating marriage-like from casual unions. To be sure, this means that some deserving parties will not
get the benefit of the default rule.  However,  dependent partners in unions of extended duration present
103 Majoritarian default rules, in general, have this information-forcing property as applied to parties who
want to opt out. For  discussion of default rules generally and their information-forcing properties, Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: an Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 88(1989); 
Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. L. Stud. 597, 606-613 (1990);.
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the most compelling claims, and these parties will be protected.
The default rule framework represents a significant improvement over current law.  Today,
many claims fail, although it seems likely either that the parties had some agreement (but what, exactly?)
or that one partner misled or exploited the other.  Default rules clarify that the conduct of parties in long
term unions will be deemed promissory unless clear evidence is offered that it is not.  The framework
functions effectively whether or not the parties have similar understandings of the terms of their
commitment to one another.  For most parties in relationships of long duration, the presumption that the
union is marriage-like probably represents accurately the parties’ explicit or implicit understanding
about property sharing and support, and thus the framework simply functions as a standard majoritarian
default.  Where the default rule does not reflect both  parties’ expectations, it has a useful information-
forcing function, putting  the burden on the dissatisfied party to identify himself explicitly as a “non-
committer.”103 
Long-term informal unions present a context in which one contracting party may be motivated
to withhold information about his intentions from the other for strategic purposes.  In contrast to
marriage, cohabitation provides no clear signal of commitment, and  it may be difficult for individuals to
discern whether their partners’ intentions are the same as their own.  Under the current regime, a
primary wage earner who does not wish to undertake legal obligations to his homemaker partner can
withhold this information, allowing her to assume that they will share property acquired during the time
they are together and that he will provide support should the relationship end.  Meanwhile, he is free to
104He may do this by maintaining separate bank accounts and by acquiring real and personal property titled
only in his name.  
105 Ayres and Gertner argue that penalty default rules can function to influence parties who strategically
withhold information to disclose (so that they will not be bound by the default rule), leading to more efficient
contracts.  In the context of intimate unions, non-disclosure by the non-committer is likely more efficient at least from
a social welfare perspective, in that it will result in a contract based on the default rule. 
106Alternatively, she can adapt her role in the relationship so that she is more financially self-sufficient.  See
Herma Kay Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1
(1987)(arguing that reducing the availability of alimony would  reduce women’s dependency and encourage financial
self-sufficiency).  In later work, Kay has written more positively about alimony and its benefits, particularly in long-
term marriages. Beyond No- Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
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structure their financial arrangements in ways that undermine her future claims.104  In this way, he reaps
substantial benefits from the relationship, and then is protected by the implicit default rule against
financial sharing between cohabiting partners.
The proposed framework  presents the primary wage earner with two options: he can (perhaps
grudgingly) accept the legal obligations that follow from the application of the default rule as the cost of
being in a long term intimate union, or he can disclose to his dependent partner his intentions not to
engage in financial sharing.105  In the latter situation, she can make an informed choice about whether to
end the union or to remain in a role that leaves her financially vulnerable.106  In any event, the default
rule allows the parties to act upon more complete information about the financial terms of their
relationship, reducing misunderstanding and exploitation. 
As compared with current doctrine, the default rule approach simplifies the judicial
determination of financial obligations between cohabitants;  it avoids an open-ended inquiry into  the
parties’ expectations in every case.   To be sure, as I have suggested, an ex post judicial determination
is a more cumbersome and less effective means to protect dependent family members than is formal
107 Carol Rose’ famous distinction between “crystal” and “muddy” rules in property law is apt in this
context. Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988).  Rose observes that human
behavior cannot be compelled by “perfect specification of rights and obligations.” Although clear rules defining
property rights generally are to be preferred, Rose argues, they can sometimes function to allow the powerful to take
advantage of the weak and gullible.  When that happens, courts  resort to “muddy” rules to achieve equitable
solutions.  In the realm of intimate unions, law makers legitimately might prefer all couples to choose marriage, a
“crystal” category, but provide the protection of  “muddy ” default rules for unmarried parties who otherwise would
be taken advantage of by their partners.  
108For example, common law spouses have been found to qualify for government death benefits and health
and life insurance. See discussion in ELLMAN, KURTZ AND SCOTT at 64- 67.  Ariela Dubler argues that common law
marriage was a means to privatize dependency of women and children in the 19th century– although she
acknowledges that many of the claims were brought by women themselves (and not by the state). Ariela Dubler,
Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 Yale L. J. 1885 (1998).  . 
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marriage, and fact finding will sometimes be complex.107   Nonetheless, the framework  provides a
means to enforce the sometimes opaque financial understandings between cohabiting partners and does
so by using familiar legal tools.   The default framework offers far greater financial security than current
law to vulnerable partners  who otherwise may be exploited or misled-- or who may simply have a
different understanding of the relationship than the primary wage earning partner. 
Enforcing implied contracts between parties in informal unions does not mean that cohabitation
would be transformed into a legally privileged status.  Put differently, the default framework is not a
revival of common law marriage, a doctrine under  which qualifying informal unions are treated as
marriage for all purposes.108   Although common law marriage is recognized in a few states today, it has
been abolished in many jurisdictions over the past century, in part because of the difficult evidentiary
issues  presented by ex post determination of family status.  In contrast to parties in common law
marriage, cohabitants who do not formally register their unions would not receive the government
benefits and other protections of marriage.  Thus, couples should still be motivated to formalize their
commitment through marriage. 
Outcomes under my proposed framework will often be quite similar to those obtained under the
109See Lynn Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute's "Domestic
Partners" Proposal, 2001 B. Y. U. L. Rev.1189; Lino Graglia, Single Sex Marriage: The Role of Courts, 2001 B. Y. U. L.
Rev. 1013.  
110  This deficiency in the A.L.I. proposal is of practical importance, but it can be easily remedied in any
jurisdiction that adopts the Domestic Partnership Principles.  The cohabitation period is to be established under a
rule of statewide application. 
111Although at least one state, Washington, has adopted status-based approach to cohabitation unions,
the overwhelming majority have sought to resolve financial disputes between cohabiting parties within a contractual
framework. See Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P2d 328 (Wash. 1984); Connell v. Francisco, 898 P2d 831 (Wash. 1995).
Moreover, no state combines recognition of a cohabitation status, with judicial discretion to set aside agreements
between cohabiting parties.
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A.L.I.’s Domestic Partnership status, which also imposes marriage-like obligations on cohabitants.  The
contract-based default framework has some advantages, however over the A.L.I. approach.  First,
many critics have argued that the Principles will generate a flood of marginal claims because the
proposed cohabitation period is brief and the standard is complex.109 The five year time period that I
propose will function more effectively to separate casual from committed unions and to  reduce
litigation.110  
Another advantage of the proposed contract default framework is that it builds incrementally on
conventional legal doctrine regulating cohabitation unions that has developed over the past generation.
As mentioned above, some courts today apply a default rule that services provided by cohabiting
parties are gratuitous. The proposed framework simply adopts a default rule that likely is more
consonant with the expectations of couples in long term marriage-like unions. In contrast, the A.L.I.’s
domestic partnership status represents an innovative, but somewhat radical legal reform that legislatures
and common law courts are likely to view with some wariness.111
Finally, and most fundamentally, a contractual framework is compatible with liberal values and
thus has a normative appeal that the status-based approach adopted by the A.L.I. lacks.  The
112As noted above, although parties can opt out of the obligations of Domestic Partnership status through
contract, courts are free to set aside contracts that depart from the distribution that parties would otherwise get. See
note _ supra.
113For example, in Carney v. Hansell, a New Jersey court regretfully found that a cohabiting partner had no
financial obligation to his partner of 16 years where he consistently made it clear during the relationship that he had
no intention to support her when the relationship was over or to share property with her. Docket No. FM-03-585-02
(N.J. Super. Ct. Chanc. Div.8\27\03). On these facts, the outcome would be the same under the default framework).
See also Wallender v. Wallender, 870 P2d. 232, 235-35 (Or. App. 1994)(property claim defeated where evidence
showed that defendant clearly expressed his intent not to share particular property upon dissolution).. 
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proposed default rules rest on realistic empirical assumptions about the intentions and expectations of
many couples in informal unions, while at the same time offering protection to naive parties whose
expectations may not be shared by their partners.  The framework recognizes, however, that sometimes
one party will reject financial sharing as a condition of continuing the relationship and his partner will
choose to remain in the union.  Parties are free to contract out of default rules.  In contrast, imposing a
marriage-like status on cohabiting parties, as the A.L.I. Principles do, excludes an option for intimate
affiliation that some parties might choose.  The A.L.I. approach assumes that financially vulnerable
partners would always choose no relationship over a relationship without financial security; in fact, some
may prefer a shared life without financial sharing.112  Adults with full information should be free to make
these choices. To be sure, sometimes the outcome under the default framework may result in
inequity.113  However, the alternative of paternalistically imposing financial obligations on unchoosing
(and even unwilling) parties after a certain period of cohabitation is even less satisfactory.  Although  an
imposed status may sometimes beneficially deter exploitation of dependent partners, it sacrifices the
freedom of individuals to order their intimate lives. 
Not so long ago, both law and morality narrowly circumscribed the freedom of individuals to
make choices about intimate affiliation; today, some people are nostalgic about a society in which
marriage was the only acceptable intimate union.  Most moderns, however, endorse the core liberal
114 Numerous surveys of young adults reveal that a high percentage plan to marry and believe that marriage
will contribute to their personal happiness. See supra. note 1. Substantial evidence supports that many homosexual
persons would marry if this option were available to them. Eskridge, The Case for Same Sex Marriage, 78-79.  
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principle that government should not interfere with the freedom of individuals to pursue their goals for
personal happiness, absent some evidence that their choices will cause harm to others.  Some couples 
may want to live together without commitment or obligation in long term relationships. As long as each
partner voluntarily chooses this arrangement and is free to leave, paternalistic government restrictions
that inhibit freedom in this private realm are hard to justify. 
*  *  *
Although government interference with intimate relationships is problematic, government can
play an active role in facilitating the attainment by individuals of their personally defined goals for
happiness.  The availability of the legal status of marriage to both same -sex and opposite-sex couples
serves this end.  Clear evidence supports that for many individuals, the opportunity to undertake a
formal commitment to another person through marriage is an important part of their life plan, and that
informal affiliation is not a satisfactory substitute.114 By holding out marriage as an option for intimate
affiliation to all adults who believe that it will contribute to their happiness, government enhances the
quality of life for many persons. 
Conclusion
Although families have changed a great deal in the past generation, marriage continues to
function usefully as a family form.  This is so because it is a relatively stable union and because the
process of formal registration provides a means to define financial rights and obligations between the
parties with some certainty.  Thus, the claim that this status is obsolete is premature, at best. Indeed,
although predictably marriage will continue to evolve as an institution to accommodate changing social
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values and practices, intimate unions grounded in formal legal commitment are  likely to endure,
because such unions function relatively effectively to satisfy society’s dependency needs. 
 
